



## THE CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)

# *News from the Front!*

**JUL-AUG 97**




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## **Operation BALKAN RUSH and TF 1-41's Deployment to Operation JOINT GUARD by MAJ Arthur N. Tulak, Collection Officer, CALL**

**T**he battalion task force that Fort Riley deployed to Bosnia on 14 Mar 97 had a compressed time schedule for its mission preparation and trainup, which began when the battalion was notified by a FORSCOM Warning Order on 11 Jan 97 that it would deploy to Operation JOINT GUARD. When 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st AD, organized Task Force 1-41 to support Operation JOINT GUARD in Bosnia, it also designated another "task force" of battalions to train up the deploying task force, and assigned rear detachment responsibilities to a battalion TF Rear. The trainer TF consisted of the 70th Engineer Bn, 1-13 Armor Bn, 4th of the 1st FA Bn, and 2-70 Armor Bn. The 70th Engineer Bn and 4th of the 1st FA Bn provided the individual-focused General Requirements Training, 2-70 Armor, the "Thunderbolts," provided company-level STX training, and 1-13 Armor ran the TF-level certification exercise or CERTEX. For the collective training exercises, the supporting armor battalions developed the STXs, packaged, and then controlled the training for TF 1-41, providing Observer-Controllers (O/Cs) and role-players. Rear detachment duties were assigned to 1-13 Armor. This arrangement, determined early on in the Brigade's decisionmaking process, allowed the deploying TF to focus on its mission and pre-deployment training tasks. In developing a training plan, the Brigade drew heavily from its experience in *Peacekeeper '95*, the combined U.S.-Russian peacekeeping exercise conducted at Fort Riley, KS.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> U.S.-Russian peacekeeping exercises conducted under the auspices of the NATO Partnership for Peace conducted at Fort Riley, KS.



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If you have articles and lessons of interest to the Total Force, please contact the Managing Editor, Dr. Lon R. Seglie, at Coml (913) 684-3035/9567 or DSN 552-3035/9567; FAX DSN 552-9564.

#### DISCLAIMER

This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product and is not intended to serve as a program to guide the conduct of operations and training. The information and lessons herein have not been staffed, but are the perceptions of those individuals involved in military exercises, activities and real-world events. The intent is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner.

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
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**REPRODUCE AND DISTRIBUTE THIS NEWS BULLETIN TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS!**

In late January and early February, in accordance with the Troop-Leading Procedures (TLPs), leaders from 3d BCT conducted a reconnaissance, deploying to the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) to observe the conduct of stability and support operations (SASOs) training emphasizing peace-enforcement operations, and to Bosnia to observe the TF's area of responsibility (AOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the leader's reconnaissance in Bosnia, the Battalion and Company Commanders and Battalion Staff spent time "right-seating" with the unit already deployed on the ground to become familiar with the SOPs, reports, and TTPs successfully employed in support of Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD. Before departing the area of operations (AO), the reconnaissance element acquired as many hard-copy and diskette-copy TACSOPs, Base Camp SOPs, reporting formats, orders, etc., as possible, and thus spared the TF from having to "re-invent the wheel." The information obtained on base camp operations was extremely important and helped to ensure that the training base camps and checkpoints constructed at Fort Riley were accurate and realistic.


In laying out the training areas for TF 1-41's trainup, Brigade and Post planners took the general architecture of the AO with the Zone of Separation (ZOS), the inter-entity boundary line (IEBL), base camps, checkpoints, etc., and recreated the U.S. Sector on Fort Riley, drawing a ZOS right through the post, with the Serbian Republic (*Republika Srpska*) in the range and impact area. The training plan called for three base camps, named *Dobol 1* and *Dobol 2*, and *Demi* to train the deploying TF on base camp operations during the collective training phase. The STX training area was astride the ZOS and consisted of four STX lanes reflecting the likely missions for the company teams: 1) Maintain ZOS (checkpoint and patrolling operations); 2) Cordon and Search (tactical mission for conducting a Weapons Storage Site (WSS) inspection/inventory); 3) Resettlement of non-combatants, and; 4) Movement to Contact/Hasty Attack. The MTC/HATK lane was necessary to reinforce the fact that as a peace enforcement operation, the forces may have to conduct combat operations to compel the former warring factions (FWFs) to comply with the General Framework on the Agreement for Peace (GFAP, a.k.a. the Dayton Peace Accord). In addition, patrol routes and MSRs were established between the camps and checkpoints.



The CERTEX was a BN TF-level exercise designed to employ all the trained collective platoon and company tasks in a fluid situation. In the CERTEX scenario, TF 1-41 received a FRAGO directing it to conduct a resettlement of non-combatants into the town of *Himmelska*. As tensions rose, the TF employed its elements to accomplish tasks aimed at maintaining peaceful conditions while accomplishing the resettlement in the face of active and passive resistance by the FWFs. The CERTEX's final phase forced the TF to conduct combat operations to prevent an armed clash between the FWFs.

Upon receipt of the training mission, 2-70 and 1-13 Armor Battalions immediately established liaison with units running STX lanes at the CMTC located at *Hohenfels*, Germany, to see what was required. The 7th Army Training Command (7th ATC) Mission Training Plan (MTP) for Stability Operations<sup>2</sup> and STX training OPORDs written at CMTC were used as the base documents to build training plans and orders for the company STX lanes and the TF CERTEX. The supporting battalions canceled gunnery and set about building the training infrastructure and training the trainers. From January to mid-February, 2-70 Armor was hard at work setting up the base camps and STX lanes, doing their utmost to ensure that they realistically replicated the conditions in TF 1-41's AOR. The biggest challenge for 2-70 AR initially was gathering the necessary materials to set up the training lanes. The Thunderbolt BN S-4 had to shake the bushes to get adequate quantities of tent pegs, cots, heaters, fuel can cradles, etc. Logisticians need planning figures as early as possible in contingency operations for the nuts and bolts "eaches." The logistics planners knew, for example, that they needed 40 tents, but who thinks about tent pegs? The layout for Camp Dobol-2, established at Fort Riley's Multi-Purpose Range Complex (MPRC), is shown above.

<sup>2</sup> See 7th Army Training Command White Paper, *Platoon Company/Team, Battalion/Task Force, Mission Training Plan for Stability Operations*, 30 June 1995. This MTP is available from CALL.



One company from 2-70 AR proofed each base camp and every STX lane before TF 1-41 began its STX lane training. Attached deploying units, such as platoons from the 977th MP Company, then followed the 2-70 AR proofing, giving the role-players a dress rehearsal while at the same time providing training for deploying units before the company-sized elements went through the lanes. The infrastructure setup, i.e., constructing the base camps, checkpoints, etc., was also a significant challenge to 2-70 AR. Peace Enforcement operations STX lanes are time, labor and resource intensive. Planners should consider reinforcing the tasked unit to support this effort. In this case, engineers supported 2-70 AR to build the checkpoints (CPs), providing Class IV and expertise, which 2-70 AR supplemented with its own manpower. The engineers designed and mass-produced a CP kit, with pre-cut plywood and beams. These kits facilitated standardization and rapid emplacement by soldiers under engineer supervision.

The Train-the-Trainer phase for the "Training TF" included training role-players. Thorough role-player training was critical to ensuring that units would accomplish the training objectives on STXs, because a poorly-trained role-player can easily derail the unit from achieving the training objectives the exercise was intended to deliver. The trainup of O/Cs paralleled TF 1-41's Individual Readiness Training (IRT), conducted by 70th Engineer Battalion. Therefore, O/Cs were prepared to execute when training shifted into the collective exercises.

All STX lane personnel came from 2-70 AR except for female role-players from support units. According to the 2-70 Armor S-2, "it takes an external battalion to set up and run CO STX lanes and set up the base camps." The 2-70 AR also provided a small team for each base camp (about ten soldiers per team under the control of a SSG or SFC "Mayor") to maintain the camp. Uniforms for the FWF role-players came from a variety of sources, but primarily the post Training Support Center (TSC). Old USAF uniforms, cook whites, and MOPP suits were combined in various permutations and combinations to provide a distinct uniform for each FWF represented during the training. Unfortunately, vehicles for the CO STX lanes did not have VISMOSDs, which would have added training realism, as most of the weapons and fighting vehicles used by the FWF are of former Soviet design.

The role-players simulating the media on the battlefield actually recorded video footage during the STX lane. Short segments of this video footage were incorporated into the AARs to reinforce key points. This was accomplished by the O/C occasionally directing the camera operator to record certain actions for use in the AAR. Because the AARs did not exceed one hour in length, one or two segments, at most, of video were used, but these segments provided the AAR leader a powerful means to reinforce key lessons learned.

A senior observer controller noted that the unit must have a plan for what to cut or how to "flex" because events do not always unfold according to the time schedule and because the tasks being trained are new and non-standard. On one lane, a platoon arrived over 30 minutes late and the O/C had to modify the training plan. Providing guidance, in advance, helps the O/C on the ground to make the right decisions on the best way to modify the lane and still achieve the training objectives.



STX lane training for the deploying company-teams began with the receipt of the mission at the base camp. Once the companies were on the STX lanes, the company commanders received warning orders for the following day's mission during the execution of the current lane. Units rotated in sequence through the four lanes, receiving tactical orders over the radio. A team of O/Cs from CMTC deployed to Fort Riley TDY to support CO STX and the CERTEx collective training and provide subject matter expertise.

At the *Cordon and Search*, STX lane companies conducted a Weapons Storage Site Inventory. Cordon and search was the tactical mission statement for conducting WSS inspection or inventory, where the mission is to ensure that FWFs are not storing any weapons beyond that which is authorized. One of the key lessons learned on this lane was how critical it is that the inspecting unit maintain a serious, business-like presence to send the right signals to the FWF forces garrisoned at the WSS. Deliberate and sure execution of the sub-tasks serve to establish the unit's credibility and can over-awe the targeted force, while conversely, hesitation and unsuredness only serve to embolden the targeted force to be less cooperative.

Soldiers must communicate a sense of urgency and seriousness to the targeted force and to non-combatants to discourage any attempts to test the unit's commitment to the task at hand. Leaders must communicate the need for a sense of urgency in their intent, and in the scheme of maneuver. This does not require soldiers to be openly hostile, but it does require them to think about the image they are conveying to others by their actions, words, and appearance. Role-players portraying the 254th AbiH Infantry Brigade (Bosnian Federation) soldiers at the WSS had been trained to tailor their response to the unit based on how deliberately and determinedly the force executed the tasks. Hesitation and lack of confidence resulted in the FWF role-players being uncooperative. Weapons orientation, vehicle orientation and positioning are part of "the message" the unit is trying to communicate and should be planned in advance. Successful units used a sand table with toy vehicles and soldiers and other means or methods to communicate the plan down to the soldier level.<sup>3</sup>


The role-players at the WSS were obstinate, confident, well-rehearsed, and presented the thinking, uncooperative, and even devious FWF which challenged the training unit's leaders and soldiers to think on their feet. The O/C stepped-in at critical points to ensure that role-players were creating the proper conditions, and to keep the operation moving on-schedule. The role-players hid unauthorized weapons throughout the WSS: under ponchos, on the roof, etc., again challenging the unit's leaders and soldiers to think. As soldiers found weapons in excess of those authorized, they photographed them in-place, and then directed a FWF soldier to retrieve them, thereby ensuring they were not booby-trapped. The CMTC O/C team TDY to Fort Riley had given the unit the IFOR WSS inspection SOP, and 2-70 AR tied the performance measures into the Cordon and Search STX lane.

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<sup>3</sup> See p. 2-23 of **FM 7-8, *The Infantry Platoon and Squad***, for the standards for a sandtable.

At the *Maintain ZOS* (Checkpoint operations) STX lane, 2-70 AR established a series of checkpoints and trained the role players to portray scenarios similar to what the unit could expect in Bosnia. Striving for ultimate realism, the supporting unit coordinated with the CG's Horse-mounted Color Troop to have non-combatant role players ride through the checkpoint on horseback or in a horsedrawn cart. The horse was a real surprise for the soldiers and at the same time replicated what the soldiers can expect to see when deployed to checkpoints in rural areas.


The extensive engineer preparation of the vehicle search area, emplacement of wire obstacles, and use of the engineer CP kits resulted in superb training realism. The vehicle search area prepared by the engineers used an earthen berm to isolate the search area and provide protection to friendly forces from potential car bombs. M35A2 truck mirrors taped to mop handles with 100-MPH tape made for excellent field-expedient search mirrors, with which to search the underside of vehicles in the search area. To conduct twenty-four-hour operations, 2-70 AR contracted for large light sets (like those used by the USAF to illuminate planes parked on the airfield) to illuminate the checkpoint and vehicle search area for night operations. TF 1-41 platoon's employed a technique that could quickly reinforce the engineer-emplaced berms and obstacles, which was to position their BFVs so that they could roll onto the road at the checkpoint, and thereby reinforce the earthen barriers on the flanks of the road, sealing off the road in an imposing manner and effectively blocking the CP with its hulking presence.





An issue involving CP operations identified by O/Cs concerns the process for selecting which vehicles to search. The unit cannot search all of them, but in the STXs they do because of the need to practice the procedures. Units need to know the analysis process of what vehicles to search and which to let pass. One O/C phrased this as the "shooting the woman with the bag of groceries" issue - how do you get the leader training to ensure that leaders know the decisionmaking process to exercise proper judgment in executing the assigned missions? The answer lies in ensuring that soldiers ask the right questions during the relief in place, or transfer of authority between units.

At the **Resettlement** STX lane, the training company monitored the crossing of Muslims into the Serb-controlled town of *Zakmur* to ensure that both sides complied with the GFAP. Role-players portrayed both sides and had a script that called for rioting to break out soon after the company arrived on the scene. The staged riot included role-players hurling insults and rocks (crumpled newspaper wrapped with 100-MPH tape) at each other and posturing for a confrontation. The 2-70 AR set up *Zakmur* in a large section of condemned WWII-era barracks, postponing their destruction long enough to conduct the trainup. In *Zakmur* the 2-70 AR O/Cs created the "House of Horror" where the exercise company had to clear out a sniper engaging soldiers and non-combatants. In the House of Horror, soldiers were tested on their ability to conduct challenging MOUT operations that included evading booby traps and mitigating the high danger for fratricide. The lane included time for retraining to fix areas identified as needing improvement during the first run. Generally, units improved their force protection measures dramatically on the second run through the village and were more deliberate in clearing the daunting House of Horror, as well as using available cover and concealment while moving outside the buildings.





Units that deployed to OJE/OJG from Europe conducted their trainup at CMTC. The CMTC has been running Individual Readiness Training (IRT) lanes since operations in Bosnia commenced, and certifies IRT lanes set up by units deploying from other commands, such as TF 1-41, by sending O/C teams TDY. Units that deployed to Bosnia built their preparatory collective training (STXs) using the 7th ATC MTP for Support and Stability Operations (SASOs) with assistance from teams of O/Cs and exercise scenario writers deployed TDY from CMTC. The team TDY at Fort Riley recommended that units deploying to OJG get copies of the SOPs used by units already "down range" in Bosnia.

While the Trainer TF handled most of the individual and collective training tasks, TF 1-41's leaders quickly found that an on-going operation the size of Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD has its own administrative peculiarities that can drive training requirements. Because Bosnia is in the EUCOM AOR, USAREUR standards and procedures apply. Those standards and procedures are often at variance from those found in CONUS. For example, the procedures for handling and transporting Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) in EUCOM reflect understandings between the Army and European governments. The Drivers in TF 1-41 had to be re-trained according to USAREUR standards. To accomplish this task, the task force sent personnel with the ADVON to Germany to train the trainer, who then trained the deploying TF's drivers on the different procedures. Another example of such unique requirements is the railhead safety concerns for units in Europe, where overhead electrified cables on rail lines create a significant hazard. The Installation Transportation Office provided a video for units to use to learn the differences between railhead operations conducted in CONUS and those conducted in USAREUR. TF 1-41's advice to units deploying to OJG is to ensure thorough liaison with the various offices and agencies "over there" (e.g., the Safety Office, Transportation, etc.) that can explain the different procedures and rules.

While TF 1-41 is currently conducting operations in Bosnia, rear detachment operations are being conducted by B Co, 1-41 Infantry. The Rear Detachment, with augmentation from Corps support, and assistance from 1-13 AR, is performing the rear detachment operations for the deployed TF, such as performing PMCS on the vehicles left behind. The rear detachment cleared all hand receipts for MILES and other training equipment used during the trainup to allow the deploying task force to focus on its deployment tasks.

Units tasked to support peace operations in the future can learn several lessons from 3d BCT's approach to preparing and deploying a TF to an on-going peace enforcement operation on short notice. By quickly determining and allocating mission-essential tasks to the units at Fort Riley, the Fort Riley Commander, 1st AD and 3d BCT were able to execute a rapid change of mission and conduct high-quality training that prepared TF 1-41 for its peace enforcement duties in Bosnia. The trainup involved the entire post, which surged to accomplish the mission within a compressed time schedule in support of the main effort, TF 1-41 IN. The application of the CMTC 8-Step Training Model set the commander's intent for the conduct of training and the standard to be achieved. By conducting reconnaissance to CMTC and the AO in Bosnia, 3d BCT leaders were able to refine the plan with first-hand observations and lessons learned/SOPs/TTPs from units on the ground. The replication of the AOR onto Fort Riley gave a logical architecture to the training layout and focused the deploying TF on its new AOR. The extensive preparation and training of role-players and the emphasis on correctly training the trainer to standard resulted in efficient execution of the training tasks. Establishing liaison with external agencies in the EUCOM AOR and coordinating for external support (e.g., the team of CMTC Observer Controllers on-the-ground on Fort Riley) paid big dividends in training efficiency and effectiveness. And finally, by placing command emphasis on rear detachment operations, the leaders and soldiers in the deploying task force were able to focus intently on mission execution. ☺

## NOTES

**The unit training schedules, briefing slides, orders, videos, and MTPs prepared by 3d BCT are available from CALL to units with a need. CALL has also published several newsletters on topics relating to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and on peace operations. For a complete listing of available CALL products, visit the CALL homepage at <http://call.army.mil:1100/call.html>.**

**All graphic illustrations in this article are courtesy of the S-3 shop, 3d Brigade, Fort Riley, KS, and are reprinted here with permission.**

# INSTALLATION MEDIA RELATIONS OPERATIONS

By CPT James E. Hutton, Military Analyst, CALL

Installation public affairs (PA) offices are the "first-line of attack" in most daily contacts with the community and media. To maximize the Army's ability to keep the American public informed about its many complex functions, media relations officers must become more innovative in delivering meaningful information about our great force. The ideas discussed here are based on experiences garnered from the National Training Center's public affairs office at Fort Irwin, CA, and are designed to help bring focus to media relations officers and others who deal with civilian news media representatives as they assemble information plans and execute media events. And, despite our focus here on installation activities, the principles discussed are applicable during deployments.



## INTERPRETING THE PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION

The Army PA, like that of the sister services, is charged with making available "timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress and members of the press, radio and television may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy."<sup>1</sup> This guidance from the Department of Defense's *Principles of Information*, stems from involvement in Vietnam and more recent conflicts. It reflects the will of the department's senior leadership to provide accurate and forthright information about military activities without exaggeration, misinformation and deception. The military simply does not withhold potentially damaging or embarrassing information.

The military has more than lived up to this claim. Indeed, while the intentions of this policy are requisite for a military program in a free society, we must make use of our PA system to fully report not only on our relatively few shortcomings but also on our many achievements. As an example, in the events surrounding the exposure of the Army's so-called "sex-scandal" in late 1996, virtually the entire PA community mobilized to address the issue with local media outlets. *(It should be noted that a "scandal" usually means the uncovering of a secret after an attempt to hide details. The media in this case did not discover this situation B they heard it from the Chief of Staff of the Army directly.)* Details of the action plan were fully laid out for public consumption.<sup>2</sup> Leaders rightly stated the Army's policy of zero tolerance.<sup>3</sup> A chain-teaching plan was detailed.<sup>4</sup> Broadcasters and print journalists alike were given daily briefings and updates. In short, the Army's message got out; we showed an ability to address a bad situation rapidly and well.

We must maximize our efforts aimed at telling the myriad of things our Army is doing **right** today. There are many stories to tell.

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense *Principles of Information*, December 1, 1983.



## POSSIBLE REASONS FOR LACK OF INNOVATION

The reason(s) for the reluctance of some PA practitioners and commanders to be innovative and relate positive information is difficult to quantify. It **may** stem from a number of possible factors, one of which is the guarding against propagandizing. (There are a number of other possibilities such as a commander's aversion to the news media or limited PA assets). The *Principles of Information* forbid the use of propaganda: "propaganda has no place in Department of Defense PA programs."<sup>5</sup> Propaganda in this context is defined as "information, rumors, etc., deliberately spread to help a person, group, movement..."<sup>6</sup> Such an effort would have as its chief component an element of deception. Widening the scope of PA efforts is not only NOT engaging in deceit or propagandizing, it is fully complying with the commander's intent to make information "fully and readily available."<sup>7</sup>

Moreover, the idea that positive information is somehow propaganda misses the guidance clearly set forth in **Field Manual 46-1, Public Affairs Operations**: "The active release of complete and accurate information influences the perception of events, clarifies public understanding and frames the public debate. It preempts attempts to misrepresent situations."<sup>8</sup>

And, while our efforts are not exactly like a business marketing program, we should recognize a key lesson learned by professional marketers: "The fact is, even your most faithful customers will forget you if you don't remind them of how great you are."<sup>9</sup>

Further, such an effort does not infer an attempt to control the media. The Army PA, for apparent reasons, cannot allow itself to devolve into spin control. Efforts at manipulation have occurred in the past. During the Vietnam War, for example, "the M(ilitary) A(ssistance) C(ommand) V(ietnam) ... develop(ed) a 'hard-head' list of reporters it considered 'worst cases' of reporters who engaged in exaggerated or erroneous reporting,"<sup>10</sup> in an obvious endeavor to control the media. Such attempts at control are not only fruitless, they run counter to the Constitutional principles we uphold.

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<sup>2</sup> U.S. Army News Release, No. 96-82, "Army Announces Sexual Harassment Panel and Inspector General Review," November 22, 1996.

<sup>3</sup> Susan Walden, "Sexual Harassment: Army's Stance Remains 'Zero Tolerance'," *Army Link News* (originally published in the *Hessen Herald*, March 17, 1997).

<sup>4</sup> Gerry J. Gilmore, "Sexual Harassment Prevention Chain - Teaching Packets Enroute to Field," *Army Link News*, January 29, 1997.

<sup>5</sup> Department of Defense *Principles of Information*, December 1, 1983.

<sup>6</sup> *Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language* (New York: Gramercy Books, 1989), pg. 1152.

<sup>7</sup> Department of Defense *Principles of Information*, December 1, 1983.

<sup>8</sup> **Field Manual 46-1, Public Affairs Operations** (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, May 30, 1997), pg. 18.

<sup>9</sup> Lesley Alderman, Karen Cheney, "Smart Ways to Make \$100,000 at Home," *Money Magazine*, May 1997, pg. 155.

<sup>10</sup> William M. Hammond, *Public Affairs, The Military and The Media, 1962-1968* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 322.

## DEVELOPING AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH

So how does a practitioner develop and execute plans for innovatively telling the whole story without propagandizing? In creating plans for events and programs, as well as long-term or ongoing efforts, ***build from the ground up***. Construct the foundation using available data-base technology and continuity information from existing files. Prepare command messages and conduct rehearsals for media encounters. In addition, the practitioner must interest the media in events and projects that *we know* are important to the Army and for the public to know. And, most significantly, we must get a definition of successful PA operations in much the same fashion as we do for all other military operations.

## CONSTRUCT THE FOUNDATION

As media relations officers, we must develop the base structure to fully develop our knowledge of the media outlets in our area of operations. We should take the widest view possible of the potential audiences for telling the Army story. As an example, a program known as "Amazing America" on cable television's The Learning Channel, was in need of programming that told a story, as the title suggests, about America. The program's producers, made fully aware of the National Training Center (NTC)'s mission through numerous phone calls, faxes, film products and a site visit, came to the conclusion that the NTC was perfect for their purposes for a 30-minute episode.<sup>11</sup> The program subsequently aired to millions of viewers.

### *Developing the base:*

***TTP: Develop a data base which includes e-mail addresses and web sites of the various media outlets, fax numbers, and points of contact. This data is important in forming the structure of the data base but that is only part of the process. Such lists, while useful, require constant updating -- not unlike the improvement of a defensive position. Working the lists is essential to successful implementation of ongoing and future projects.***

By ***working*** the lists, the practitioner routinely calls or contacts the primary outlets and just as importantly constantly seeks out new outlets.

***TTP: Consider sending cover letters and pre-packaged material, such as video products, special edition newspapers, and visitor's guides to a broad range of targeted local, regional and national media outlets. Often, periodicals with seemingly no apparent interest in military matters will see something in your packet that is useful for coverage.***

**Examples include the following: city and county newsletters, scientific journals, documentary writers and producers of various types (in consultation with the Chief of Army Public Affairs - Los Angeles Branch), special interest publications and business magazines.<sup>12</sup> Added to that list are daily newspapers and television affiliates apart from the local installation's normal interest area that may have interests in projects not previously considered.**

This effort is endless. There are thousands of media sources, most of which have a constant need for storylines. It is important to note that many of the publications and electronic outlets have very little knowledge of military matters. Coach them along; develop interest where there may have been none before. Make a strong effort toward providing opportunities for media to participate in events to the fullest extent allowable by law and good sense. You may think your three-day MLRS live-fire is business as usual, but the public-at-large may be seeing the sky ignited by streaking rockets for the first time.

<sup>11</sup> The Learning Channel, "Amazing America," Episode Subject: National Training Center Opposing Force. Original air date, February 25, 1997.

<sup>12</sup> One example includes an article that appeared in a business periodical concerned with management styles and methods: Richard Pascale, "Fight, Learn, Lead," *Fast Company*, Aug-Sep 96, pgs. 65-72. The article, written about the Army's Combat Training Center's method for experiential learning, was crafted by the author to fit the magazine's focus.



## PREPARE - PREPARE - PREPARE

Combat organizations do routine things routinely. Preparing for combat or for PA activities requires many of the same elements. *Develop a plan. Rehearse the plan. Execute the plan.* But as we well know, working the details of the plan is the crux of staff work -- and that is where the hard work begins.

*Command messages lay the ground work for PA activities.*

**TTP:** Without command messages that are clear, known to all in the command, and user-friendly (i.e., soldier-friendly), media encounters are haphazard at best and disastrous at worst. (Imagine a direct support field artillery battalion without a fire support plan, and you can envision encountering the media without command messages.)

*Good organizations rehearse all aspects of the plan.*

**TTP:** Rehearsing for media encounters does not mean planting untruths or spins. Provide soldiers command messages and teach them to "stay in their lane." Also provide a list of potential questions with correct and meaningful information. This technique will serve our soldiers and ultimately the public well. The exercise of allowing soldiers to hear questions that may be asked in a non-threatening, scenario-based rehearsal will enable the soldiers to *think* about answers. It also allows leaders to discern potential problems with operational security. Perhaps more importantly, such rehearsals emphasize in the minds of junior soldiers that media interviews are work -- and should be seen as an event that can support the mission.

Leaders require rehearsal as well. Leaders at all levels generally have more information available to them and can lend a broader perspective. Provide leaders the command messages in advance of rehearsals, and subsequently interview them with potential questions. Rehearsals of this nature will aid the leader and the media interviewer. Evaluate each answer in the rehearsal for clarity, correctness, infusion of command messages and sufficient detail. Do not forget operational security.

Leaders should think clearly about what they want the public to know and be intent on conveying a defined message. Consider the media lesson learned by General (Ret.) Colin Powell:

"More lessons in the care and feeding of the media. You do not have to answer every question put to you. They get to pick the questions. But you get to pick the answers. And I learned the hard way. . .to aim beyond the audience of one who is asking the question. Shape your answer, instead, to the audience of millions who will be watching the tube."<sup>13</sup>

*Execution of the plan is vital.*

**TTP:** When executing the plan, that is escorting the media to various soldiers and leaders (to include civilians), *adherence* to the principles of information should be balanced with operational requirements (such as time constraints) and, as always, operational security. The individual needs of the media visitors *must never become* the over-riding factor in the execution of the plan.

<sup>13</sup> Colin L. Powell (with Joseph E. Perisco), *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), pg. 372.

## INTERESTING THE MEDIA

The idea of "getting the media out" often leads to nothing if specific plans and expectations are not detailed. Sending untargeted invitations, creating unfocused "media days," and poorly articulating potentially interesting and useful ideas for the various media outlets are common shortcomings when trying to entice media visits.

### *Print journalists' needs.*

**TTP: *Print media* are reliant on interviews. Unless specific personnel are sought, provide knowledgeable, rehearsed soldiers who are fully cognizant of command messages. Although many media members will want to interview the most junior soldiers (there is a feeling among many reporters that junior soldiers are more honest) the PA practitioner, aware of the writer's angle, is better able to decide an interview list than is the media. For example, if the storyline sought by the writer is "Army Readiness," an Army corporal is not equipped to give answers broad enough in perspective to adequately address the issue.**

### *Electronic media needs:*

**TTP: While also reliant on interviews, electronic media needs quality visuals. Locate interviews in places that emphasize the points of the command messages or the level of importance of the interview. Most electronic media are equipped with *Beta cameras and editing suites*. High-quality video products from your archives in Beta format will often be useful for media outlets in preparation for the evening news. *Provide tailored products* for the outlet and subject matter being discussed. Consider providing stock footage (known as "B-roll") of training or equipment that the media may not be able to get on their own.**

Finally, as the PA representative of the installation or unit, ***tell the media why*** readers or viewers will find what the units are doing is worth reading or seeing. As mentioned before, many in the media have little or no knowledge of military matters. While the media is the ***conduit to the public***, it is important to remember that we must first educate the news media to properly get our message out. The media, of course, will decide in the end what will be published or broadcast, but the PA officer can greatly influence the final product by properly educating and teaching members of the press.

As a part of the effort described above in preparing for the media, the reliability of the media is worth considering when coordinating interviews or events. The PA practitioner must maintain credibility with commanders and soldiers **B** make sure their time is well spent.



## DEFINING SUCCESS

Combat arms commanders routinely define success for the operational plan. An operations order requiring "destruction" of the enemy clearly defines what "destruction" means. Public affairs annexes to operations orders and installation-level memoranda of instruction can, and in the future must, have similar guidance.

Defining success for the PA community is a new concept. Today, few commanders would see success as no media coverage during a particular event. While avoiding the media was once a goal, leaders now must see media encounters as opportunities to tell their story. Commanders must articulate success and PA practitioners execute.

*Clearly articulate success.*

***TTP: First, ensure the entire command is aware of the command messages and has sufficient information to interact with visiting media. This can be verified during scheduled rehearsals coordinated by the PA officer. Commanders understand the military importance of conducting combat rehearsals. Conduct rehearsals for PA events in much the same fashion. Bring in all potential players (usually interviewees), wargame possible scenarios, conduct practice interviews, and evaluate the rehearsal.***

***Second, consider the magnitude of the event. If the event is the Advanced Warfighting Experiment, sending invitations to major publications and electronic outlets is in order. For a local post change of command, tailor the invitation list accordingly. Assuming the event is properly evaluated for importance, target the types of media that should visit from various markets.***

***Consider the following:***

**Send out a fixed number of invitations. Realistically assess the number expected to attend. Keep in mind print and electronic media differences.**

**Be careful not to promise the command so-called positive articles. We do not control the media. Telling a full and accurate story, however, usually results in an accurate story by the media.**

**Assess the final printed or broadcast products. Answer the question: *Did our command messages come through?* (This is obviously a subjective practice. Use your best judgment in evaluating the overall aspects of the product.)**

## CONCLUSION

Do not lose sight of the goal of thoroughly informing the public. *Properly target outlets* using your media lists and contacts. Assist the command in assessing outcomes.

Beyond event planning, most installations have many ongoing operations that would be of interest to local, regional and potentially national media. Events, such as live-fire training, ARTEPs, small deployments, and newly instituted programs, can often be used as storylines.

Establish a program to systematically invite local and other media by looking around your installation for things that are routinely done well. As an example, a post hospital may have instituted a new baby-care program - such a program may appeal to the human interest segment of the local paper. Deployment of a new piece of equipment during a live-fire exercise may be attractive to a scientific journal. The possibilities are endless and cannot be exhausted.

Educate soldiers and leaders about the positive aspects of a well informed public. Assist them by developing useful command messages, potential questions and answers, and exacting rehearsals. And, ensure the concept of "staying in your lane" is thoroughly understood.

Finally, to fully realize the potential of PA to positively affect the Army, commanders at various levels must recognize that staffing and equipment of installation PA offices influences outcomes. A trained and logistically supported PA team provides tremendous "bang for the buck."

Just as the sign at the gate entering the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, promises "World Class Training for the World's Best Army," PA officers should feel compelled to tell the world about their great force. We have proven to the public that we do not hide our troubles -- and the public has come to expect that -- now we must do equally well at relating our force's successes.☺





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# ATTACK AVIATION IN RESTRICTED TERRAIN

by MAJ Bob Werthman, 2ID, Korea

**Know yourself,**

**know the enemy, *but***

**always analyze and apply the effects of terrain.**



These are seemingly simple enough terms for the professional warrior. However, knowledge of the terrain and the effects it can have on a military operation is a skill that is increasingly becoming clouded by modernization. This article provokes some thoughts on the proper use of attack aviation in restricted terrain using the Korean peninsula as a template. While **FM 1-112, *Attack Aviation Helicopter Battalion***, includes METT-T in all of its tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), it primarily focuses on open terrain with little relief. Korea, which is punctuated with rough mountains, large streams, and rugged narrow passes with only about 20 percent of the peninsula suitable for cultivation, quickly brings renewed emphasis for understanding METT-T. The Korean Peninsula comprises numerous ridgelines and hills that afford excellent cover from direct fire and ground observation. Restricted terrain affords attack aviation little chance for success unless properly controlled and employed. The proper use of command relationships, attack reconnaissance and battlefield synergism can mean the difference between mission accomplishment and failure.

In Korea, the 2d Infantry Division has one Aviation Brigade with one AH64 Attack Helicopter Battalion assigned. The OPCON of this extremely lethal asset is usually accompanied by the same unintended restrictions, "Don't Piecemeal Apaches" and "Husband the Resource." Unfortunately, ground commanders as well as attack helicopter commanders adhere to this restriction a bit too literally. A Division Commander would operationally control an attack battalion to a ground maneuver brigade only after careful consideration and analysis. The Division Commander may need to improve the correlation of forces (COFMs) ratio but realizes that the ground commander who owns the terrain is the most suitable agent to coordinate the attack of ground and air assets. He may visualize that the ground commander needs the unique capabilities of the AH64, unrestricted maneuver and night visionics with magnification, to conduct reconnaissance or a preemptive strike to desynchronize the enemy. The Division Commander may even operationally control them to the ground commander in a "911" situation where ground forces are taking heavy casualties due to an unsuccessful breaching operation. Korean terrain offers the Division Commander many possibilities for the OPCON of attack assets.

Korea's many defiles make the AH64's unique capabilities a primary asset to ensure force protection in the close fight. However, the ground force commander will seldom be able to employ a complete Apache Battalion in mass in this type of terrain. He may employ AH-64's in small lead-wingman teams or he may use the entire battalion in the one-third rule. Apaches lead-wingman teams flying some 3-5 KMs ahead of ground scouts can be employed at night to find the enemy and alert ground forces to ambushes, disposition, etc. This would still leave the ground commander sufficient combat power in the Attack Battalion to execute typical missions such as destroy the counterattack force or reserve.



Unfortunately, this type of employment poses a quandary. Doctrinally, an Attack Battalion can be operationally controlled to no lower than a ground maneuver brigade. However, tactics dictate that the ground commander in contact is the best agent to control or integrate Apaches fires into the fight, to preclude fratricide and to take measures to synchronize direct and indirect fires. The maneuver brigade commander should control the asset for planning, but during employment and execution, the AH64s must talk and work specifically with the ground force commander, regardless of the size of that force. Moreover, the brigade commander must ensure that the attack and ground force commanders are executing within his intent. This concept is not new and has successfully been employed by Special Operations Attack Aviation on numerous "real-world operations" to facilitate command and control, increase lethality and prevent fratricide.

In deep operations, commanders caution against "trolling for tanks" and appropriately allow Apaches very little flexibility to maneuver beyond the assigned engagement area and designated routes. If the attack battalion, in support of the maneuver brigade, is told to attack the reserve in EA Stuart, then we expect the reserve to be on the move long enough for us to detect, identify, and track the enemy formation. Unfortunately, Korean terrain negates this detection by usually providing the enemy reserve a covered and concealed route to the engagement area. The enemy reserve may have to move in a typical scenario only 2,500 meters, hardly enough distance to detect, identify and track. A more viable mission is to orient the attack helicopters on the enemy force. A moving enemy reserve would normally not have time to make defensive preparations or to have a robust ADA threat, allowing AH64s to discover the formation even in daylight from standoff range. This type of mission allows attack aviation to fully negate and exploit the advantages that restricted terrain provides to the enemy.

Battlefield synergism may not necessarily mean simultaneous synchronization. An NTC environment forces the ground commander to synchronize his total combat power in one or two engagement areas -- simultaneous engagements to destroy the enemy in mass. However, simultaneous synchronization in restricted terrain is extremely difficult to control and very vulnerable to fratricide. A far better plan is to destroy the enemy reserve as a preemptive measure since the reserve is probably not dug in and would not have to move any appreciable distance to enter the intended engagement area. In essence, the AH64s would find and destroy the reserve as the enemy's main body crossed the LD and was engaged by direct fire weapon systems. The synergistic effect of this operation is that the enemy would have to deal with a close fight as well as operations in his rear, simultaneously.

Adjusting command relationships, modulating attack reconnaissance and sequencing synchronization may not be suitable for desert operations or doctrinally correct by our manuals, but they are extremely effective in desynchronizing the enemy in restricted terrain. The old adage that the only good tactic is the one that works is quickly reinforced by the restricted terrain on the Korean peninsula where METT-T analysis can mean the difference between victory and defeat. ☸



## THE TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER BATTLE CAPTAIN IN *Stability and Support Operations*

by CPT Robert McWilliams, Battle Captain, 1BCT, 1AD, Bosnia



**You are the night shift battle captain in the brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC). You receive a report of three explosions heard about two kilometers away from one of your Observation Posts (OPs). You know there are friendly patrols in that area. Intelligence sources also suspect an ethnic group has been demolishing houses belonging to another ethnic group.**

***What do you do?***

No doctrinal publication exists on the position of battle captain in the TOC.<sup>1</sup> This is especially true in the Army's expanding role in support and stability operations (SASOs). Ideally, a senior captain having completed command makes the best candidate for this job. However, as a rule, a senior lieutenant or junior captain who has recently graduated from the officer advanced course is placed in the position. With that audience in mind, this article provides you with a TOC overview of the TOC and it will also highlight some of the battle captain's responsibilities. It addresses useful tools that will make your job easier and more efficient. Ultimately, success in the SASO arena means that you: *understand the TOC and how it works, know your job within the TOC, and use the many available tools to enhance efficiency and effectiveness.*

### TOC OVERVIEW

**"The TOC exists for two reasons: 1) to set the conditions for the success of subordinate units, and 2) to provide information that assists the commander in the command and control of his unit."**<sup>2</sup> The TOC functions primarily as an information center processing a high volume of message traffic, reports, and orders. It must act, direct, inform, and decide based on the information. An efficient TOC communicates well internally as well as externally, integrating its players (S-3, S-2, Fire Support, Engineer, Chemo, ADA, ALO). In the SASO arena, this team gets bigger. As the TOC battle captain, you must be able to integrate the S-5 (civil-military officer), Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and the Staff Judge Advocate officers. Everyone can contribute something.

<sup>1</sup> CALL Newsletter No. 95-4, Mar 95, *CTC Quarterly Bulletin*, 2QFY95, *Diverse Techniques and Procedures*.

<sup>2</sup> Fontenot, COL Gregory, Cdr, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Div.



You must remember SASO's non-standard nature enables units to offer capabilities beyond those for which they were designed. For example, the chemical decontamination platoon may function as a water transport, water heating, or shower unit. These missions can limit disease among refugees, or improve unit morale. The air defense artillery battery has forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) capability. This can greatly enhance ground surveillance and perimeter security at night. You must train yourself to think beyond the traditional methods of employing assets. You also may have non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the International Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, and Feed the Children. In your theater of operations, governmental organizations from the United Nations, international governments, and the host nation can help greatly. (In Bosnia, the peace implementation force used the International Police Task Force (IPTF) to handle most of the domestic problems to which the civilian police wouldn't respond.) Stability and support operations may require you to actually interact with local faction members, civilians, and particularly local civilian authorities.

## THE BATTLE CAPTAIN

You, as the TOC battle captain, serve as the supervisor of a "Crisis Management Center." You receive massive amounts of information and must decide who gets it, what happens to it, and if it impacts the mission. You are the first set of eyes that analyzes information before the commander gets it. The prudent battle captain conducts a quick, but thorough analysis of the data before passing it to the "boss." The most important question the battle captain must ask himself when analyzing a report is, "So what?" You must ensure the units report what they see, not what they think they saw or what they think happened.

**KNOW THE MISSION:** You also serve as the "number two" man in the TOC; therefore, you must understand the "big picture." You must maintain situational awareness - the ability to grasp how the small pieces impact the overall mission. In SASO, the missions are numerous and varied. On any given day, the brigade may have a hundred separate missions occurring simultaneously. The responsibility for tracking them rests on your shoulders. It is vital to understand the Rules of Engagement, or ROE. Subordinate units will call seeking guidance or clarification on an issue, and the TOC turns to the Battle Captain for the answers. You'd better know the right answer -- guessing can have dire consequences.

**KNOW YOUR UNIT'S ROLE:** In SASO, it is particularly important to know where the military role ends and the civilian or NGO role begins. In Bosnia, for example, Task Force Eagle separated the former warring factions, consolidated their heavy weapons, and oversaw the return of the factional armies to garrisons. The Army did not build refugee shelters, handle civil disputes, or pursue war criminals. You, as resource allocator, must understand the mission parameters as not to wrongly commit forces. You find these mission parameters in many sources like operations orders, fragmentary orders, commander's guidance and standing operating procedures.

**KNOW THE CULTURE:** You must also understand the culture in the area of operations. Know when the groups celebrate religious holidays, why one ethnic group hates the other, and how the ethnic bias of civil authorities influences fair, or unfair, treatment of all groups. Know where each ethnic group's boundaries are in your sector and how this impacts the mission. For example, a member of an ethnic group showed up at a U.S.-established checkpoint in the neutral zone. He reported his car had broken down and he needed assistance. The TOC received a call for guidance. You, knowing the nearest police station in another ethnic group's area, wisely opted to direct him to a police station run by members of the same ethnic group.



**MEET THE COMMANDER'S INTENT:** You are the "enforcer." You ensure units execute missions in accordance with the operations orders. You ensure the units send timely, accurate and complete reports. It occasionally means being the bad guy and "bugging" the units until they give you the needed information. Setting the conditions for the units' success means "playing hardball" when required. Late, incomplete, or inaccurate reporting can cause the commander to make bad or slow decisions.

**GET HELP WHEN NEEDED:** Finally, and most importantly, you must know when to involve your boss. When events move beyond the routine, when soldiers' lives are immediately at stake, when your decision may hamper another mission, and particularly when you mess something up that you can't fix - it's time to find the boss.

For example, in Bosnia, the TOC received a report at 0200 that two Muslim women had been seriously injured in a traffic accident. The women required immediate medical attention. We couldn't reach the local police or the IPTF. The medics administered first aid, but the women still needed more extensive treatment. Ten minutes elapsed, and the TOC called for a MEDEVAC. Twenty minutes later, the MEDEVAC helicopter called the TOC and reported it had gotten lost and did not know its current location. We learned the hard way to notify the commander, or at least the S-3, at this point. Consider the implications: an American UH-60 and crew were missing, the lives of two local women rested on our ability to coordinate a MEDEVAC, negative publicity of failure could significantly hamper relations with the factions, and higher headquarters was waking up their top brass. The commander deserves the courtesy of knowing and controlling what happens in his unit. Luckily, a second MEDEVAC successfully took them to an adequate military hospital. Although the first helicopter landed dangerously close to a minefield, daybreak enabled the first helicopter to reorient itself and return home safely. Remember, bad news only gets worse over time. The soldiers and equipment belong to the commander. It's his privilege and responsibility to make the hard decisions. You only offer recommendations.

## TOOLS OF THE TRADE

**MISSION TRACKER:** In Bosnia, we refined three useful tools that made the Battle Captain's job easier and the TOC more efficient. The first was the Mission Tracker. We used a spreadsheet to track the numerous and diverse daily missions. Unit, time, mission, location, and remarks comprised the headings. The unit column went to platoon level. The time column represents the start time and expected duration of the mission. The location column includes routes and grids. Updated mission status, usually updated every two hours, goes in the remarks column. You can use the Mission Tracker to update the commander when he calls for a situation report, to update higher headquarters, and to aid in command and control of all of the units.

A sample Mission Tracker is shown on the following page.



## MISSION TRACKER FOR 12 APR 97

MSN #	UNIT	ACTION	LOCATION/TIME	STATUS AND RESULTS
1	2/A	MONITOR COMPLIANCE, CP OPS A2	CPA2/ALL DAY	
2	A TRP	A6: CPA2, BH33, SNEED	SP 1300	
3	1/A	LA WALKER SECURITY	LA WALKER/ALL DAY	
4	1/A	TRP QRF	LA WALKER/ALL DAY	
5	A TRP	LOGPAC: CP A2	SP1900	
6	B TRP	B6: ESCORT COOP OWNER FROM ZDREBAN TO 501st AND BACK, THEN GO TO MODRICA, KOZICI(1200 TOWN MTG),SNEED	SP 0830	
7	3/B	PROVIDE SECURITY FOR 440 SIGNAL & 501 st MI.	OP123/ALL DAY	
8	B TRP	LOGPAC TO 123	SP 1730	
9	1/B	LA KUNTZ SECURITY	LA KUNTZ/ALL DAY	
10	B TRP	TRP QRF	ALL DAY	
11	1/C	HAMPTON BASE SECURITY/ DART MISSION	HAMPTON BASE/ALL DAY	
12	3/C	SQDN/TRP/ HILL722 QRF	HILL 722/ALL DAY	
13	C TRP	C6: SNEED	SP 0630	
14	2/C	LA TUCKER SECURITY	ALL DAY	
15	C TRP	DAY PATROL: RTEs MOSBY & PULASKY, HAMPTON	SP 0830	
16	A/23 EN	COMMAND MAINTENANCE, 1st: RECON RTE MELON	SP 1300	
17	A/23EN A&O	FINISH BERM WORK @ HAMPTON, THEN BURKE WASHRACK	SP 0730	
18	C/6-6	DAY RECONS: NAIs: A-D, R-W	SP 1000	
19	C/6-6	DAY QRF	0800-1800	
20	C/6-6	NIGHT RECON: NAIs E270, BH75, BH72, E921, R610, B803	SP 2000	
21	C/6-6	NIGHT QRF	1800-0300	
22	C/6-6	MAINTENANCE TEST FLIGHT	0800-2000	
23	C/6-6	LOGPAC TO SNEED	SP 0900	
24	C/6-6	CONVOY TO TUZLA (APPLE, MICH, ARIZ)	SP 0800	
25	HHT	MAIL RUN	SP 1500	
26	HHT	A-C LOGPAC	SP 1000	
27	HHT	S-3 CONVOY TO TUZLA (OFFICIAL FAREWELL)	SP 1800	
28	HHT	DCO TO KIME BASE	SP 0800	
29	HHT	DISMOUNTED PATROL: RAT RTE WEST	SP 1900	
30	CA/CI/P SYOPS	AARP @ DONJA LEDNICE (BQ970770), GORNJI SLATINA (CQ005825, ORLOVO POLJE (CQ060795)	SP 0830	
31	SCO	SCO MISSION	O/O	



**SIGACTs BOARD:** We also used a significant activities (SIGACTs) board. We wrote on a sheet of "butcher paper" posted on an easel on which we tracked spot reports. Its headings consisted of Unit, Time, Event, Location, and Action Taken. This board served several functions. It kept all members of the TOC abreast of the significant spot reports of the day. It ensured communication between the S-2 and S-3 section. It also ensured that some action was taken, if necessary, on the event. This helped to keep information from passing by the battle captain and prevented things from "slipping through the cracks." You can also write planned missions on the SIGACTs board to serve as a reminder. For example: A unit will escort a convoy starting at 0900, with a 0800 linkup. You, as the battle captain, should expect a report from the unit that linkup and execution of the convoy has occurred. If not, put on your "enforcer" hat and give them a call.

**BATTLE CAPTAIN SMART BOOK:** Lastly, we used the battle captain smart book. Since its composition will vary with the mission and area of operation, some generic sections include frequently used numbers (higher, lower, civilian, NGOs), dialing instructions for local phone lines, key people (NGOs, civilian authorities, faction leaders), faction unit locations (sector sketch), and a tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) playbook. The TTP playbook serves as a model in the proper response in certain situations. For example: You receive a report of automatic weapons fire (which, in Bosnia, occurs nightly). Your actions: Send out patrol to investigate, notify local authorities, notify the IPTF, continue to monitor. It follows a flowchart format and branches off where different circumstances require different responses.



You now have a sense of the battle captain's responsibilities, particularly in the non-doctrinal world of stability and support operations. The battle captain's ability to communicate, work efficiently, anticipate events, analyze information, and remain organized makes him successful. I have provided you with some tools that kept the TOC, and battle captain, running smoothly in Bosnia. Unit mission will drive the development of your TOC's tools. Take the many tools used by various units and adapt them to fit your TOC operation. Never forget your two top priorities: 1) *set the conditions for the success of your subordinate units*, and 2) *provide timely, accurate information to assist the commander in the command and control of the unit*.

*If you succeed in these two areas, you will succeed overall. ☺*